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The Weak ness of So cial Ac tors in CEE
Ex ploit ing or Con soli dat ing the Trade Un ions
in Post-com mu nist Ro ma nia?
ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU
The trade un ions’ de vel op ment in Cen tral and East ern Europe em pha sizes 
the dif fi cult ar ticu la tion, the high de gree of frag men ta tion and the lack of strength 
of these so cial ac tors1. This is also the case of the Ro ma nian post-com mu nist trade 
un ions2. In or der to jus tify their slow con soli da tion and the lack of ef fec tive ness, 
sev eral ex pli ca tive fac tors were pro vided by the ex ist ing lit era ture: such as the 
lack of in ter nal de moc racy in these so cial or gani sa tions3, the eco nomic poli cies 
adopted by the gov ern ments in tran si tion4 and the path-de pend ency in flu ence re-
sult ing from the so cial ist past5. Al though the Eu ro pe ani za tion proc ess of trade un-
ions seem to have di rect ef fects in de fin ing the new la bour re la tions6, the weak ness 
of the in ter est rep re sen ta tion in CEE con tin ues to be a gen eral fea ture em pha sized 
by the em piri cal stud ies.
Fur ther more, de spite of a rich lit era ture on this topic, very few re searches 
have con cen trated on the analy sis of the CEE trade un ions as de scrib ing simi lar 
pat terns of be hav iour with the ones en coun tered in the weak cor po ra tist tra di-
tions in West ern Europe. Or, these coun tries have suf fered com pa ra ble changes re-
lated with poli tics in part ner ship re la tions, par ticu larly in what con cerns the link 
1 C.M. FREGE, ”Understanding Union Effectiveness in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary 
and Slovenia”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 53-76; András TOTH, 
”The Transformation of the Industrial Relations System in Hungary”, South-East Europe Review 
for Labour and Social Affairs, no. 1, 1998, pp.117-133; Terry COX, Mason BOB, ”Trends and Deve-
lopments in East Central European Industrial Relations”, Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 31, no. 2, 
1998, pp. 97–114; P. KUBICEK, ”Organised Labour in Post-communist States: Will the Western 
Sun Set on It, Too?”, Comparative Politics, vol. 32, no. 1, 1999, pp. 83-102; David OST, ”The Weakness 
of Strong Social Movements: Models of Unionism in the East European Context”, European Journal 
of Industrial Relations, vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 33-51.
2 Umut KORKUT, ”Entrenched Elitism in Trade Unions in Poland and Romania: An Expla-
nation for the Lack of Union Strength and Success?”, Economic and Industrial Democracy, vol. 27, 
no. 1, 2006, pp. 67-104; Aurelian MUNTEAN, ”Romanian Labor Movement Between Workers’ 
Padded Coat and European Values: New Perspectives on Romanian Trade Unions”, Paper pre-
pared to be presented at the international conference Globalization, Integration, and Social Development 
in Central and Eastern Europe, University “Lucian Blaga”-Sibiu. 5-9 September 2003.
3 Umut KORKUT, ”Entrenched Elitism...cit.”.
4 Carles BOIX, ”Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic 
Policies of the Advanced Nations, 1960-93”, World Politics, vol. 53, no.1, 2001, pp. 38-73.
5 D. OST, ”Illusionary Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism and Post-com-
munist Class Identities”, Politics and Society, vol. 28, no. 4, 2000, pp. 503-530. For the Roma nian 
case see Ninucia PILAT, ”Stratégies et perspectives de renouveau syndical dans la Roumanie 
postcommuniste”, Transitions, vol. XLVII, no. 2, 2007, pp. 145-165.
6 Ninucia PILAT, ”Towards the Europeanisation of trade unions in post-Communist 
Romania”, SouthEast Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs (SEER SouthEast Europe Review for 
Labour and Social Affairs), no. 2, 2007, pp. 95-107.
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be tween the state and the trade un ion move ment. Fol low ing the ap proaches de vel-
oped in the analy sis of cor po ra tist tra di tions, this study con sid ers that by em pha-
siz ing the role of the stra te gic re la tions es tab lished be tween the gov ern ments and 
the un ions in what con cerns bar gain ing and co op ta tion proc esses1 in a post-com mu-
nist coun try, the weak ness of trade un ions in Ro ma nia can not be fully un der stood 
with out con sid er ing the ac tors’ pref er ences and in ter ac tions2. The dy namic di men-
sion in the ex pla na tion of the trade un ion re con figu ra tion cen tred on in di vid ual ac-
tors pro vides thus in sights on their two di men sional con soli da tion. The first 
di men sion con cerns an ex ter nal axis in the analy sis of trade un ions that is nour-
ished by the scru tiny of the re la tion ship be tween the po liti cal realm and the trade 
un ions; mean while, the sec ond di men sion re gards an in ter nal axis which aims at 
pro vid ing an in-depth analy sis of the or gan isa tional ad ap ta tion and the in ter nal re-
con figu ra tion of the post-com mu nist trade un ions.
The stra te gic ap proach in the un der stand ing of the trade un ions starts from 
the as sump tion that al though the post-com mu nist eco nomic tran si tion im plied 
high costs and (at least at the theo reti cal level) the de vel op ment of strong con flic-
tive in dus trial re la tion ships, the lack of le gal frame work and the poli ti ci sa tion of 
the so cial area would rather fa vour the per sis tence of weakly ar ticu lated bar gain-
ing sys tems. There fore, as Molina sug gested, in the case of other coun tries with 
weak cor po ra tist tra di tions, the col lec tive bar gain ing sys tem that tends to ”re sort 
to forms of top-down po liti cal gov ern ance and man age ment of the con flict”3. This 
top-down ar ticu la tion of the trade un ion be hav iour that ap pears both in the bar-
gain ing pro ce dures at the ex ter nal level, in flu enc ing the trade un ions in ter ac tions 
with the po liti cal scene, and in the con struc tion of the mecha nisms of power at the 
in te rior of the trade un ions.
Thus, this ar ti cle aims at pro vid ing an al ter na tive ex pla na tion of the varia-
tions in the in flu ence that the trade un ions are ex er cis ing upon the de ci sion-mak-
ing proc ess, by look ing at a par ticu lar case: the post-com mu nist Ro ma nia. In what 
fol lows this pa per ar gues that the ar ticu la tion and the con soli da tion of the trade 
un ion move ment, in the con text of de moc ratic con soli da tion are de pend ent upon 
the re con figu ra tion of both the po liti cal be hav iour and the trade un ion’s strate-
gies. The trans for ma tion of the state func tion ing and the re con struc tion of the po-
liti cal field in flicted a change in the way in which the trade un ions’ lead ers have 
de cided to cope with these changes. In deed, from an in ter ac tive per spec tive, the re-
con figu ra tion of trade-offs, in stalled be tween the po liti cal ele ments and the trade 
un ions is con du cive to the trans for ma tion of the bar gain ing sys tem and the in ter-
nal or gani sa tion of these so cial ac tors.
The fol low ing sec tions of the ar ti cle pro ceed to a mi cro-level analy sis of the 
in tra-un ion strata, as well as on the re la tions es tab lished be tween the la bour 
1 Sabina AVDAGIC, ”Accounting for Variations in Trade Union Effectiveness: State-Labour 
Relations in East Central Europe”, MPIfG Discussion Paper 03.6.2003.
2 Oscar MOLINA, Martin RHODES, ”Corporatism: The Past, Present and Future of a Con-
cept”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 5, 2002, pp. 305-331. See also IDEM, ”Industrial Rela-
tions and the Welfare State in Italy: Assessing the Potential of Negotiated Change”, West European 
Politics, vol. 30, no. 4 September 2007, pp. 803-829; Marino REGINI, ”Between Deregulation and 
Social Pacts: The Responses of European Economies to Globalization”, Politics & Society, vol. 28, 
2000, pp. 5-33.
3 Oscar MOLINA, “Trade Union Strategies and Change in Neo-corporatist Concertation: 
A New Century of Political Exchange?”, West European Politics, vol. 29, no. 4, September 2006, 
pp. 640-664/p. 644.
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organi sa tions and the po liti cal scene. The fol low ing sec tion will con cen trate on a 
short pres en ta tion of the theo reti cal frame work and will pro ceed to a brief over-
view on the trade un ions in Ro ma nia af ter 1989. The sec ond sec tion will de velop 
the ex ter nal di men sion of the analy sis, by em pha siz ing how the State be comes an 
im por tant ac tor in con fig ur ing so cial part ners’ ar range ments and the in for mal re-
la tions es tab lished be tween the po liti cal and the so cial sphere. Thirdly, the study 
will fo cus on the analy sis of the in tra-un ion level, as an im por tant fac tor in the ex-
pla na tion of the lack of co her ence and pro fes sion ali za tion of trade un ion func tion-
ing in Ro ma nia. The last sec tion of the pa per fo cuses on of a case study, em pha siz ing 
the ar ticu la tion and con soli da tion of the civil ser vants trade-un ions in Ro ma nia.
The Trade Un ions Con soli da tion:
An Ana lyti cal Frame work
The emer gence of trade-un ions in CEE coun tries fol lowed dif fer ent path ways 
de pend ing on dif fer ent coun try tra di tions. Nev er the less, in the post-com mu nist 
coun tries, a gen eral trend was in stalled which is char ac ter ized by a form of ”pat ri-
mo nial” type of cor po ra tism1 and un der in sti tu tion al ized pat terns of be hav iour 
con cern ing the tri par tite ne go tia tion proc ess and the trade un ions or gani sa tions. 
Re sult ing from a lack of tra di tion of dia logue and from a weak state2, the trade un-
ions seem un able to ar ticu late the in ter est of their mem bers.
In or der to ex plain the weak ness of the post-com mu nist trade un ions a tri ple 
re con figu ra tion proc ess should be taken into ac count3: a struc tural and or gan isa-
tional re con struc tion; a lead er ship change and a dis course re con figu ra tion ex-
hib it ing a dif fer ent iden tity. From this per spec tive, the ex pla na tion of the slow 
con soli da tion of the so cial ac tors has gen er ally been scru ti nized from a ge netic ap-
proach em pha siz ing the con tinu ous lack of force of the move ment. How ever, in 
what is fol low ing I ar gue that in the analy sis of the trade un ions’ de vel op ment one 
im por tant theo reti cal dis tinc tion is to be made be tween the trade un ion for ma tion 
and the con soli da tion proc ess. This first dis tinc tion is re in forced by the dif fer ence 
be tween the for mal and in for mal mecha nisms that these or gani sa tions tend to mo-
bi lize in their bar gain ing pro ce dures. In this man ner the ini tial ge netic weak ness 
of these move ments dur ing the tran si tion phase and the dif fi cul ties that they had 
to cope with do not nec es sar ily im ply the con ti nu ity of their lack of force in the 
CEE coun tries.
In ad di tion to this, the weak ness of trade un ion move ment due to frag men ta-
tion and per son al isa tion of the so cial re la tions does not nec es sar ily im ply the to tal 
lack of in flu ence of these so cial ac tors. Through the post-com mu nist pe riod, the 
trade un ions con tin ued to mo bi lize their mem bers in or der to ful fil their fi nan cial 
re quests. Simi lar to other South ern Euro pean coun tries, the po liti cal mo bi li sa tion 
1 Olivier PEYROUX, ”Rôle et influence actuels des contre-pouvoirs associatifs et syndicaux 
en Roumanie”, Studia Politica, Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 987-1070. 
2 Concerning the weakness of the state in the post-communist countries see Arista Maria 
CIRTAUTAS, ”Post-Leninist State: A Conceptual and Empirical Examination”, Communist and 
Post-communist Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, 1995, pp. 379-392.
3 Ninucia PILAT, ”Stratégies et pespectives de renouveau syndical...cit.”, p. 145.
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of the trade un ions can be seen as em brac ing an in stru men tal di men sion in or der 
to achieve pol icy and or gan isa tional bene fits1. In the ab sence of a uni tary ac tion, 
the un ion’s strate gies fo cused on the adop tion of dis tinct ideo logi cal di vi sions. 
The weak or gani sa tions that had to deal with the de crease of mem ber ship over the 
1990s could thus de ter mine a form of ”top-down in ter est gov ern ance of dis tribu-
tive con flict” ob tained ”in dif fer ent ways with dif fer ent com bi na tions of in ter-as so-
cia tional and state in ter ven tion”2.
The lack of in sti tu tional func tional in stru ments of con cer ta tion is to be 
thought as de ter min ing in its turn a shift in the role played by the in di vid ual ac-
tors and in the re la tion ship cre ated be tween them. The crea tion of net works of co-
he sion founded on com mon in ter est can es tab lish the gen eral frame work for the 
func tion ing of trade un ions and can pro vide the gen eral sta bi li sa tion of the trade 
un ion move ment and the re in force ment of their bar gain ing power3. From this per-
spec tive, the hid den in flu ence un der pinned by scru ti niz ing rather in for mal mecha-
nisms should un veil a dif fer ent pic ture re gard ing the trade un ions’s role in 
post-com mu nist set tings.
As Molina un der lined, the roots of the in ter ac tions in weak cor po ra tist tra di-
tions play a ma jor role in the ar ticu la tion of the trade un ion move ment. They are 
con du cive to a se ries of ex changes of goods be tween the so cial and the po liti cal ac-
tors4. The na ture of these ex changes de pends on a gen eral frame work re flected in 
the na ture of re la tion ships es tab lished be tween the po liti cal ac tors and be tween 
the po liti cal ac tors and the so cial sphere. The ex ist ing shift in the gov ern men tal be-
hav iour, re flected by the trans for ma tion from a cli en tel is tic per spec tive to wards 
party dis tri bu tion logic would also in flict on the trade un ions’ strate gies to a more 
in stru men tal role of their lev er age force in re la tion ship with the po liti cal ac tors. 
Con se quently, the sys temic char ac ter is tics en coun tered in poli tics in what con-
cerns the colo ni za tion of the state re sources and the per son al iza tion of poli tics5 are 
also re pro duced at the so cial level.
There fore, the ar ti cle will ar gue that in the con text of de moc ra ti sa tion, the con-
soli da tion of the trade un ion move ment is de pend ent on the shift tak ing place 
within the po liti cal arena, point ing to the pas sage from a po liti cal form of pa tron age 
to wards a party-based form of pa tron age. The pas sage from cli en tel is tic re la tions, 
1 Oscar MOLINA, ”Trade Union Strategies...cit.”, p. 642.
2 Ibidem, p. 645.
3 We intend to use more broadly the concept of elite convergence; by transferring this con-
cept from the political scene towards the social sphere. In a similar manner, the paper sustains 
the idea that the imbrications of the relations between actors can lead to a process of stabilisa-
tion of the new trade union movements. For the analysis of the elite stabilisation, see Michael 
G. BURTON, John HIGLEY, ”Elites Settlements”, American Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 3, June 
1987, pp. 295-307.
4 Oscar MOLINA, ”Trade Union Strategies...cit.”, p. 645.
5 For such references regarding the CEE countries see: Ingrid BIEZEN, ”Political Parties as 
Public Utilities”, Party Politics, vol.10, no. 6, 2004, pp. 701-722; Ingrid BIEZEN, Petr KOPECKY, 
”The State and the Parties: Public Funding, Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary 
Democracies”, Party Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, pp. 235-254; Anna GRZYMALA-BUSSE, ”The 
Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions. Post-communist Party Competition and State Oversight”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 271-300; Petr KOPECKY, ”Political Parties 
and the State in Post-Communist Europe: The Nature of Symbiosis”, Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics, vol. 22, no. 3, 2006, pp. 251-273.
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char ac ter ised by the logic of per son al ised so cial ex change1, to wards the domi na-
tion of the state and the semi-pub lic sphere by the po liti cal par ties and the elite net-
works2, has in our view an im por tant im pact not only on the con soli da tion proc ess 
of the trade un ions, but also in the form of un ion ism which is go ing to de velop in 
post-com mu nist set tings. From this per spec tive, the emer gence of the trade un-
ions in a con text domi nated by cli en tel ism, which is ”shown to neu tral ize the sys-
tem of rep re sen ta tion, as friends are placed in the stra te gic syn apses of power and 
mecha nisms of con trol”3, would first cre ate per son al ised net works that fa cili tates 
the con soli da tion of the new so cial ac tors at the top of the move ment, by em ploy-
ing their con nec tions with other ac tors.
From this per spec tive, para doxi cally, the cli en tel is tic mecha nisms which at a 
first glance blocked the proc ess of pro fes sion ali za tion of the trade un ion move-
ment in the post-com mu nist pe riod pro vide the foun da tions for the con ti nu ity 
and per petua tion of a con soli dated trade un ion move ment. The in sti tu tion ali sa-
tion of in di vid ual po liti cal par ties in the re gion de ter mined in fact a re con sid era-
tion of the trade un ion’s ac tions in what con cerns the bar gain ing proc ess. The 
re in force ment of par ties in di rectly forced the in sti tu tion ali sa tion of the in for mal 
mecha nisms es tab lished be tween the trade un ion lead ers and the po liti cal area. 
Fur ther more, it is our sec ond hy pothe sis that this proc ess of ex ter nal be hav iour re-
con figu ra tion de ter mined in its turn, or was si mul ta ne ous de vel oped with the in-
ter nal or gan isa tional ad ap ta tion proc ess. The top-down ar ticu la tion of power at 
the in tra-un ion level, re sult ing from the need to ne go ti ate with the po liti cal realm 
and con structed on the dis tri bu tion of se lec tive in cen tives to wards the trade un-
ions’ mem bers pro duces a cer tain de gree of sta bi li sa tion of these so cial ac tors.
Ro ma nian Trade-Un ions
and Their Post-com mu nist De vel op ment
The Ro ma nian trade un ions do not pre sent a long his tory of in de pend ence 
and in ter est rep re sen ta tion. The break down of com mu nism brought the rapid 
emer gence of new trade un ions: in 1990 there were 30 na tional con fed era tions. 
This was pri mar ily the re sult of a very per mis sive le gal frame work that touched 
not only the trade un ions, but also the NGOs and the po liti cal par ties. The new leg-
is la tion al lowed the po liti cal and so cial or gani sa tions for ma tion on the ba sis of 
very few mem bers en cour ag ing the ap pear ance of very frag mented po liti cal and 
so cial spheres. The first law adopted af ter 1989, the Law 54/1991 gave the right to 
at least 15 em ploy ees to form a trade un ion (art. 2, align. 2)4. The newly emer gent 
1 Luis RONINGER, Ayse GUNES-AYATA, Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, London, 1994; Herbert KITSCHELT, ”Linkages between Citizens and Politi-
cians in Democratic Polities”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, no. 6/7, 2000, pp. 845-879.
2 Peter MAIR, Petr KOPECKY, ”Political Parties and Patronage in Contemporary Demo-
cracies: An Introduction”, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, 25-30th of April, Nicosia. 
3 Luis RONINGER, “The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of 
Civil Society in the Contemporary World”, in Luis RONINGER; Ayse GÜNES-AYATA (eds.), 
Democracy, Clientelism...cit., p. 9. 
4 There were several exceptions to this provisions: those detaining leadership positions in state 
apparatus in Parliament, Government, ministries, mayors, prefects, the judges and the prosecutors, 
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trade un ions were con cerned with mem ber rep re sen ta tion in the ne go tia tion for col-
lec tive con tracts. The law stipu lated the right of trade un ions to as so ci ate in pro fes-
sional fed era tions (art. 42, 2) in or der to en sure the ne go tia tion with the struc tures 
of own er ship. Sev eral fed era tions were able to form a con fed era tion that con ducted 
ne go tia tions with the gov ern ment and the own ers at the na tional level. As a re sult, 
dur ing the one and a half years over 14 trade un ion con fed era tions were formed. 
Nev er the less, their num ber has been de creas ing dur ing the re cent years1.
Al though trade un ions be came state part ners in the tri par tite ne go tia tion 
proc ess, given the slow pri va ti sa tion proc ess, the lack of eco nomic re forms, they 
were co erced to re main very close to the state. Dur ing the first years of tran si tion, 
the state has em braced a dou ble role: as the me dia tor of the so cial con flict and the 
main em ployer2. This im pos si ble dis tinc tion of roles in flicted on the ar ticu la tion of 
the trade un ions’ move ment and on the en tan gle ment be tween the so cial ac tors 
and the po liti cal area. How ever, there were sev eral phases in the ar ticu la tion of the 
le gal frame work re gard ing the trade un ions’ pos si bil ity to act.
1. The first pe riod 1991-1996 is char ac ter ised by the open ness to wards the 
emer gence of the trade un ions but un der the di rect con trol of the state. Dur ing this 
phase al though the le gal frame work for the crea tion of the trade un ions was 
adopted, their lib erty was lim ited in what con cerns the right to strike. Given the 
lack of pri va ti sa tion, the sal ary block ing pro ce dures and the lack of ju di cial in stru-
ments that could per mit ted the so lu tion of the work con flicts, the ca pac ity to act of 
the trade un ions was lim ited. There fore, the trade un ions’ ac tiv ity through this pe-
riod is char ac ter ised by a blurred line be tween poli tics and the so cial ac tors. Fur-
ther more, some of the ac tions of the newly emer gent trade un ions’ had an 
in stru men tal role in the po liti cal bat tles.
2. The ab sence of le gal mecha nisms that char ac ter ised the first years of post 
com mu nism came to an end dur ing the 1997-2000 pe riod. This mo ment co in cides 
with the start of the pri va ti sa tion proc ess. Sev eral in stru ments were es tab lished by 
the laws adopted. Dur ing this phase the tri par tite ne go tia tion com mit tees were 
formed3 and the col lec tive work con tract were cre ated4. The Eco nomi cal and So-
cial Coun cil was es tab lished in or der to en sure the so cial dia logue at na tional 
level5 hav ing a con sul ta tive role in the re struc tur ing of the na tional econ omy, the 
pri va ti sa tion strate gies, work re la tions, sala ries and the so cial wel fare (art. 5). Fur-
ther more, sev eral laws con cern ing the so lu tion of the work con flicts6 com pleted 
the le gal re quire ments in or der to cre ate a valid so cial dia logue. Nev er the less, the 
the army personnel, the Internal Affairs with the exception of civilians could not form a trade un-
ion (art. 5, L54/1991). See Law 54/1 august 1991 regarding the trade unions, Monitorul Oficial 
(thereafter MO), no. 164, 7.08.1991.
1 Olivier PEYROUX, ”Rôle et influence actuels des contre-pouvoirs associatifs...cit.”, p. 1022.
2 Ibidem.
3 The Governmental Decision 89/1997 regarding the formation, organisation and functioning 
of the the consultative social dialogue committees in the ministeries and at the county level, MO, 
I, no. 57, 4.04.1997.
4 The Law 130/6 December 1996 regarding the collective work contract, reprinted in MO, 
no. 184, 19.05.1998.
5 The Law 109/2.07.1997 concerning the organisation and functioning of the Economic and 
Social Council, MO, no. 141, 7.07.1997.
6 The Law no.168/12.11.1999 concerning the solution of the work conflicts, MO, no. 582, 
29.11.1999.
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trade un ions’ role in the tri par tite ne go tia tion re mained mar ginal and the mecha-
nisms in stalled by the law were not func tional.
3. Start ing with the year 2000, the trade un ions started to be come more autono-
mous by us ing the le gal mecha nisms in or der to ob tain so cial bene fits. The re vi-
sion of the La bour Code un der the Euro pean scru tiny con sti tutes such an ex am ple. 
Al though the close ness of the trade un ions in re gard to the po liti cal field was pre-
served, it em braced rather dif fer ent forms. In this man ner, unlike as dur ing the pre-
vi ous pe riod, domi nated by the in for mal mecha nism, the na ture of the re la tion ship 
be tween the trade un ions and the poli tics has em braced rather for mal as pects. Fur-
ther more, de spite the de crease in mem ber ship of the trade un ions’ move ment the 
main four con fed era tions in 2003 counted over 2 000 000 mem bers1, Ro ma nia still 
ex hib it ing one of high est fig ures of un ioni za tion in the re gion.
The Close ness to the State:
Trade Un ions Poli ti ci sa tion
The late ar ticu la tion of a le gal frame work and the lack of eco nomic re forms 
dur ing the first post-com mu nist years en cour aged the ex is tence of a blurred line 
be tween the po liti cal area and the lead ers of the trade un ions. This situa tion is 
most visi ble on two main di men sions: (1) the co op tion into poli tics of the trade 
un ions’ lead ers and (2) in the ar ticu la tion of in for mal ne go tia tion mecha nisms or 
ex changes be tween the poli tics and the trade un ions’ in flu enc ing their long-term 
strate gies. The two di men sions and their en tan gle ment are con du cive to the es tab-
lish ment of per son al ized, in for mal re la tions be tween the two spheres, but also 
had an ef fect on the sta bi li sa tion of the un ion ism in Ro ma nia.
The trade un ion move ment in Ro ma nia pre served a high de gree of frag men ta-
tion, as a re sult of ideo logi cal po si tion ing and the close ness to the state. The new 
so cial ac tors have de vel oped an ideo logi cal dis course that al lowed them to dif fer-
en ti ate and le giti mise their frag men ta tion. How ever, this ideo logi cal ref er en tial 
con sti tutes a bar rier against the uni fi ca tion of the trade un ion’s move ment. The 
five main con fed era tions which sur vived and con soli dated as the main trade un-
ion ac tors claim dis tinct val ues, some of them shift ing from one doc trinal po si tion 
to wards an other in or der to gain po liti cal sup port for their ac tions.
The Car tel Alfa con fed era tion as sumed from the be gin ning a Chris tian-De-
moc ratic af filia tion, mean while CNSLR-Fră ţia was situ ated at the other end of 
ideo logi cal spec trum: the so cial de moc racy. Two other con fed era tions were also 
close to the po liti cal field CSDR sup port ing a right ist ide ol ogy (al though this con-
fed era tion is the only one pre serv ing a cer tain dis tance from the po liti cal area), 
mean while the BNS had a tra di tion of sup port ing mainly the left side of the po liti cal 
spec trum. Nev er the less, the con fed era tion sup port for the po liti cal par ties shifted 
from one pe riod to an other. If in 1992, be fore the sec ond round of the presi den tial 
1 The membership figures were: National Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Romania 
Brotherhood (CNSLR-Frăţia) 800 000, National Trade Union Bloc (BNS) 375 000, National Trade 
Union Confederation Cartel Alfa 325 000, The Democratic Trade Union Confederation of 
Romania (CSDR) 345 000 The National Trade Union Confederation-Meridian 170 000. For further 
details see Ninucia PILAT, ”Stratégies et pespectives de renouveau syndical...cit.”, p. 98.
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elec tions, all the ma jor con fed era tions an nounced their sup port for the De moc-
ratic Con ven tion of Ro ma nia’s can di date, a coa li tion of his tori cal cen tre-right 
wing po liti cal par ties, in 1995 Mi ron Mi trea one of the chiefs of the CNSLR-Fră ţia, 
the main con fed era tion at the time de cided to sign an agree ment with the so cial-de-
moc ratic gov ern ment. The situa tion of bi po lar iza tion of the trade un ion’s ac tions 
started at that time con tin ued through the fol low ing years. If in 2000 elec tions 
CNSLR-Fră ţia and BNS were con sid ered rather al lies in sup port ing the so cial de-
moc rats, dur ing the last elec tions in 2004, BNS de cided to opt for an ex treme so lu-
tion, sup port ing the Ro ma nian Ex trem ist Party PRM.
In fact, from the be gin ning of the 1990s the Ro ma nian trade un ion move ments 
did not in cor po rate their iden tity as so cial ac tors. A re cur rent idea ap peared in 
what con cerns the crea tion of po liti cal par ties in or der en sure their in ter est rep re-
sen ta tion1. Such was the crea tion of the Party of So cial Soli dar ity in 1992, a struc-
ture voted at the level of the con fed era tion that was ab sorbed by the So cial 
De moc ratic Party in 1994. Later on, dur ing the elec tions in 2004 the BNS cre ated the 
Na tional De moc ratic Party that ne go ti ated with the PRM their sup port in ex change 
of 15 par lia men tary seats. The trade-un ions in Ro ma nia tend to con sider that only 
a di rect rep re sen ta tion can guar an tee the suc cess of their claims. There fore the con-
tinu ous re la tion to the state could be read as a stra te gic ac tion. Nev er the less, the 
pres er va tion of the frag men ta tion of their in ter nal di vi sion and their poli ti ci sa tion 
could also be seen as a re sult of the po liti cal in tru sion2 that en cour aged their frag-
mented ac tions. De spite of an in ter na tional trend to wards the uni fi ca tion of the 
trade un ions’ move ment3, these so cial ac tors re mained dis-uni fied in their ac tions.
The trade un ions’ ac tions in what con cerns the re la tion ship with the po liti cal 
spec trum can not be lim ited to their elec toral strate gies. Their in volve ment in the 
main po liti cal cri sis is ob vi ous. Dur ing the first phases of the de moc ratic con soli da-
tion, the un ions de manded their di rect par tici pa tion in es tab lish ing the eco-
nomic re form poli cies or other as pects of the po liti cal re forms. By the same 
to ken, the Co or di na tion Com mit tee of the main con fed era tion CNSLR-Fră ţia, 
Car tel Alfa, CSDR adopted in March 1999 a reso lu tion for the re form of the elec-
toral code by the in tro duc tion for the vote in sin gle mem ber dis tricts. Nev er the-
less, a re con figu ra tion of the trade un ion’s ac tions and claims has oc curred. In 
1 An illustrative example is the declaration of the Petre Tancău, the president of the Natio-
nal Federation of the Trade Union in Chemistry Domain ”Lazăr Edeleanu”, local councillor at 
Năvodari city and PSD member since 1995: ”We started from the idea that we don’t have any 
representatives in Parliament and we’ve tried to send our people in the legislature in order to 
support the laws that focused on the trade union’s members”. Interview by Lavinia SICLITARU, 
Ziua, no. 4093, 22.11.2007, http://www.ziua.net/ct.php?id=49046 (accessed on 2.12.2007).
2 As the CSDR leader Iacob Baciu declared to the press: ”It is true that at the political level, 
no one desire such a construction. They realize that this organisation once created will have an 
important saying on the labour market”, in Ştefania ENACHE, ”Sindicatele ’globalizează’ piaţa 
muncii”, Săptămâna Financiară, no. 87, 20.11.2006, http://www.sﬁ n.ro/articol_6932/sindicatele_glo-
balizeaza_piata_muncii.html, (accessed on 2.12.2007).
3 Despite the international trend of unification of the trade union’s movement of the 
International Confederation of the Free Unions and the World Confederation of Labour the same 
tendency did not succeed in the Romanian case. Although during a first phase the main confed-
erations decided to merge in the General Confederation of Labour this initiative was unsuccess-
ful. Cartel Alfa did not join this initiative for ideological reasons and CSDR abandoned it during 
the bargaining process.
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2001, in the ne go tia tion of the So cial Agree ment with the So cial De moc ratic gov-
ern ment, for the first time, one could ob serve a uni fied de ci sion to chan nel the un-
ions’ de mands to wards spe cific ob jec tives fo cused on the change of the work 
re la tions leg is la tion1.
The same ten dency to wards change can be en coun tered in the case of the 
most ob vi ous form of in ter ac tion be tween the trade un ions and the po liti cal 
sphere: the co op tion of the trade un ions rep re sen ta tives in the po liti cal area. 
The most fa mous ex am ples in this man ner are the cases of Vic tor Cior bea, Miron 
Mi trea and Marian Sârbu. Cior bea was the leader of the Uni ver sity of Bu cha rest 
trade un ion and the presi dent of the Free Trade Un ions in Edu ca tion. Shortly af ter, 
he was elected presi dent of CNSLR. At the be gin ning of ’93, CNSLR and the 
CNSLR-Fră ţia Con fed era tion, leaded by Mi ron Mi trea, merged and formed the 
most im por tant con fed era tion. Shortly af ter wards, the con fed era tion split due to 
po liti cal di ver gences2. On the one hand, Cior bea signed a pro to col of col labo ra tion 
with the De moc ratic Con ven tion (CDR)3 and cre ated an other na tional con fed era-
tion CSDR. This pro moted Cior bea in the po liti cal life, first be ing elected as the 
mayor of Bu cha rest and then ap pointed Prime min is ter. On the other hand, Mi trea 
grew closer to the left ist side of the po liti cal sphere. Elected in 1993 as the presi-
dent of the So cial Soli dar ity Party, the party ul ti mately merged with PDSR and 
Mi trea be came one of the vice-presi dents in 1995. Mi trea re mained an im por tant 
ac tor on the Ro ma nian po liti cal field: in 1996 he be came a mem ber of the Par lia-
ment and dur ing 2000 and 2004 the Min is ter of Trans por ta tion. A simi lar pat tern 
of be hav iour can be de picted in the case of Marian Sârbu, the vice-presi dent of the 
CNSLR (1992-1994) that oc cu pied min is te rial po si tions as well as elected port fo-
lios. These ex am ples from the early his tory of trade un ion ism in Ro ma nia are not 
sin gu lar. Un ion lead ers still be come in volved in the po liti cal life4. How ever, there 
is change in the trade un ions’ lead ers in what con cerns their re la tion ship with the 
po liti cal scene. If at the be gin ning of the 90s the trade un ion’s lead ers rep re sented 
the un ion’s in ter ests and they were co-opted by the po liti cal par ties be cause of 
their con nec tions and their au thor ity at the level of the trade un ions which could 
shift the bal ance in the elec toral fight, af ter the last par lia men tary elec tions the re-
cruit ment of these lead ers is jus ti fied rather by their no to ri ety and less be cause of 
their rep re sen ta tion and mo bi li sa tion power5.
1 The development of the trade unions actions was constructed on the basis of political and 
social chronologies. See Domniţa ŞTEFĂNESCU, Cinci ani din istoria României, O istorie a eveni-
mentelor (1989-1994), Maşina de Scris, Bucureşti, 1998; IDEM, Doi ani din istoria României. O istorie 
a evenimentelor (ianuarie 1995-ianuarie 1997), Maşina de Scris, Bucureşti, 1998; Stan STOICA, 
România. O istorie cronologică 1989-2002, Editura Meronia, Bucureşti, 2002.
2 Interview with the former chief of the CNSLR and Romanian Prime minister Victor 
Ciorbea, April 2005.
3 The Democratic Convention in Romania, which governed between 1996 and 2000. 
4 Several examples for the legislature 2004-2008 can be noted: Pavel Todoran, ex-president 
of CNSLR-Frăţia, member of the PSD and deputy; Ion Giurescu, ex-president of the confedera-
tion of trade unions Ceres, also a PSD deputy, Olguţa Cocrea, president of the Postal Trade 
Unions from Bacau county, and Costel Ovidenie, president of the Postal Trade Unions, both of 
them deputies. See www.cdep.ro. (accessed on 3.04.2008)
5 By the same token in the same article Petre Tancău, declared that: ”Each of these gentle-
men entered on the party lists and conducted their electoral campaign with the party that pro-
posed on their lists. During the first mandate the situation was different they beneficiated from 
the trade unions’ support”, see the above indicated interview in Ziua. 
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The In ter nal Re con figu ra tion
of the Trade Un ion Or gani sa tions
The re con figu ra tion of the trade un ion’s strate gies re gard ing their re la tion-
ship with the po liti cal ac tors and their shift ing po si tion ing were made pos si ble by 
the in ter nal ar ticu la tion of power at or gan isa tional level. Re cent stud ies have 
shown a gen eral trend de scrib ing Ro ma nian con fed era tions that be came con-
scious of a solid al li ance be tween them in or der to achieve in ter est rep re sen ta tion1. 
Al though the such ef forts were made by all the na tional con fed era tion, the fi nal re-
sult con sisted only in an Al li ance of the Trade Un ions Con fed era tions in Ro ma nia 
(ACSR) that united in a su per fi cial man ner three of the four main con fed era tions: 
CNSLR-Fră ţia, BNS) and CNS Me rid ian, How ever such a trend was bet ter iden ti-
fied by Ninucia Pi lat at fed era tions level, by tak ing into ac count the en ergy sec tor 
that cre ated the Fed era tive Un ion of trade un ions2.
In ad di tion to this, the trade un ions lead ers’ lib erty of ac tion was based on 
three main in ter nal fea tures of these or gani sa tions. The first ele ment con cerns 
their lim ited ca pac ity of their mem bers’ mo bi li sa tion, and thus the ab sence of a 
mass par tici pa tion of the un ion’s mem ber ship at the level of the con fed era tions de-
ci sions. The sec ond main ele ment that fa voured this high de gree of lib erty in the 
lead er ship’s ac tions was the way in which the de ci sion-mak ing proc ess was im ple-
mented at the in tra con fed era tion level. The ar ticu la tion of a cen tred de lib era tive 
proc ess was en cour aged by the in sti tu tional de sign stipu lated in the con fed era-
tions’ statu tory docu ments. The third ele ment is con sis tent with the pres ence of a 
trade offs sys tem at the-in tra un ion level. The con fed era tions de vel oped a sys tem 
of dis tri bu tion of col lec tive and se lec tive in cen tives fo cused on their mem bers that 
al lowed the pres er va tion of the lead er ship power. The de vel op ment of the trade 
un ions’ or gani sa tions as par al lel busi ness ven tures cre ated a struc ture of loy alty at 
the un ion level that al lowed the lead ers to act in ac cor dance with their will.
In what con cerns the ar ticu la tion of power at the in te rior of the Ro ma nian trade 
un ions move ment one can ob serve the emer gence of a stratarchial de ci sion-mak ing 
proc ess. All the ma jor con fed era tions claimed the con struc tion of de moc ratic se lec-
tion mecha nisms for the un ions’ lead er ship and of in clu sive de ci sion-mak ing proc-
ess in fact, the in ter nal in sti tu tional de sign fa voured the con cen tra tion of power in 
the hands of the con fed era tion lead ers. The Ex ecu tive Bu reau of the con fed era-
tion, the main body of de ci sion-mak ing at the na tional level is elected by the trade 
un ion’s dele gates at the na tional Con gress which is held every four years. A sig nifi-
cant dif fer ence in this re spect can be ob served in the case of Con fed era tion Me ri-
dian where the Con fed era tion’s Con gress has only the right to pro nounce it self on 
the ap point ments of the presi dent, sec re tary gen eral, Con fed era tion’ Sec re tary 
and the Audi tor (art. 34). In deed, in this spe cific case, the ap point ments are made 
in stead by the Na tional Coun cil of the Con fed era tion. Sev eral varia tions can also 
be en coun tered in the de gree of in te gra tion sup posed by the ex ecu tive struc tures 
of the lead er ship. For in stance, in the case of Car tel Alfa the ex ecu tive struc ture is 
formed by five per ma nent mem bers, in the case of CNSLR-Fră ţia it is com posed 
by a presi dent, prime vice-presi dent and an other seven vice-presi dents (art. 50).
1 Ninucia PILAT, ”Stratégies et perspectives de renouveau syndical…cit.”, p. 158.
2 Ibidem, pp.145-165.
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The Me rid ian Con fed era tion Ex ecu tive Bu reau com prises a more in clu sive body of 
de ci sion-mak ing formed by the presi dent, the vice-presi dents, the sec re tary gen-
eral, the Sec re tary of Con fed era tion, the ex ecu tive presi dents (art. 43). Nev er the less, 
the gen eral trend pre sent in all the cases, al lows the con cen tra tion of power in a nar-
row cir cle of lead ers and of ten in the hands of the presi dent. As an ex am ple, in spe-
cific cir cum stances, the Ex ecu tive Body of the CNSLR-Fră ţia has the right to sus pend 
or to dis miss at the de mand of the Presi dent, the presi dents of the County Un ions 
(art. 50, lit. i) and the Presi dent of the Un ion can de cide to dis miss dif fer ent per sons 
in or der to ac quire a higher level of ef fi ciency in the un ion ap pa ra tus (art. 54).
Al though there are varia tions at the in tra un ion or gani sa tions’ mor phol ogy 
there is a gen eral pat tern con du cive to the cen trali sa tion of power at the level of 
the na tional lead er ship. As a re sult, there is no sur prise in the high de gree of re pro-
duc tion of these ac tors in their lead er ship po si tions. A sur vey con ducted at the in-
tra un ion level un der lined the fact that ”over whelm ing 90% of the un ion lead ers 
had been hold ing these po si tions for more than 7 years” as well as the ex is tence of 
a strati fied con struc tion of the trade un ions, un der lin ing the dis tance be tween cen-
tral lead er ship in ter est ar ticu la tion and the grass roots mem ber ship1. How ever 
this situa tion can not be ex plained only by the un ions’ in sti tu tional de sign. The 
trans for ma tion of the trade un ions in par al lel joint ven tures dis trib ut ing col lec tive 
in cen tives to their mem bers is an other de ci sive ele ment in the ex pla na tion of the 
lead er ship auton omy. This trans for ma tion of the trade un ions’ func tion ing fa-
voured the build ing of loy alty re la tions at or gan isa tional level.
Dur ing the post-com mu nist years, the trade un ion’s ac tions were not lim ited 
to the mem bers’ in ter est rep re sen ta tion. The stat utes of the con fed era tions con tain 
pro vi sions re gard ing this di men sion of re ward ing of the un ion’s mem bers. The 
con fed era tion had the right to cre ate com mer cial en ter prises, in sti tu tions that dis-
trib ute in cen tives to the mem bers (art. 52, CNSLR-Fră ţia). The con fed era tions’ re-
sources are chan nelled to wards the fi nanc ing of cul tural events and the sup port of 
so cial cases (art. 7, Me rid ian). The power to de cide such ac tions is de tained by the 
Con fed era tion’s Ex ecu tive body. As a re sult through out the years the trade un ions 
de vel oped a par al lel struc ture of fi nanc ing and re dis tri bu tion that al lowed the con-
soli da tion of their in ter nal co he sion. As an ex am ple, CNSLR-Fră ţia de tains in its 
pat ri mony im por tant in fra struc tures in the tour ism area that are rented. Fur ther-
more, the con fed era tion de tains sev eral en ter prises with the same pro file such as 
Eu ros ind Tur ism founded in 2003 or Sind. Ro ma nia SRL (in this case, stocks are 
also de tained by Car tel Alfa (28%), BNS and CSDR (17,5%)). Car tel Alfa de vel oped 
fi nan cial funds from their stocks in TS Ticket Ser vice S.A that prints lunch tick ets. 
They also founded an in sur ance firm. The BNS is the sole auc tion eer of the BNSIND 
Im pex SRL, a com mer cial firm con cerned with the mar ket stands. CSDR is the only 
con fed era tion that has not de vel oped through the years its own busi ness pro file.
The trade un ions’ con fed era tions di ver si fied their ac tions in or der to de velop 
their funds. This strat egy does not touch only the na tional level but also the lower 
lev els of the or gani sa tion. Simi lar pat terns of be hav iour can be de picted at the fed-
eral level. The study of Pi lat on the en ergy sec tor em pha sized a pa ter nal is tic logic 
fo cused es pe cially on fi nan cial mat ters and a sys tem of re wards2. Prac ti cally at all 
the in tra-un ion lev els the lead ers have de vel oped this kind of en ter prises hav ing 
1 Aurelian MUNTEAN, ”Romanian Labor Movement...cit.”, p. 18.
2 Ninucia PILAT, ”Stratégies et perspectives de renouveau syndical…cit.”, pp. 153-158.
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dif fer ent de grees of suc cess. These busi ness ini tia tives in volved the trade un ion’s 
mem bers and per mit ted the con struc tion of a co he sive sup port1, con sti tut ing a sys-
temic fea ture of the trade un ions’ move ment and fa vour ing an in crease sta bi li sa-
tion and auton omy of these or gani sa tions.
Ana lys ing the Civil Ser vants’ Trade Un ions:
A Case Study
As al ready men tioned, the gen eral trend in the be hav iour at the con fed era tion 
level seems to be re pro duced at the lower level of the trade un ions. De spite the gen-
eral ten dency of cre at ing close links with the state func tion ing and the crea tion of 
the top-down mecha nisms at the in ter nal level, the trade un ions in Ro ma nia suc-
ceeded to ac quire a cer tain de gree of auton omy. These rela tively new move ments 
adopted spe cific tools in the ar ticu la tion of their mem bers’ in ter ests. In or der, to ex-
em plify the stra te gic ad ap ta tion of the trade un ion’s move ment to wards the sta bi li-
sa tion and the in de pend ence, this sec tion fo cuses on a spe cific case study: the trade 
un ions of the civil ser vants in the cen tral ad min is tra tive ap pa ra tus. Given the fact 
that the civil ser vants are the em ploy ees of the State, they are to be con sid ered more 
in ti mately con nected with the State struc tures, their con soli da tion be ing more dif fi-
cult than in the other cases af fected by the pri va ti sa tion proc ess.
Cur rently, sev eral civil ser vants un ions ex ist, af fili ated to dif fer ent na tional 
con fed era tions2. The most im por tant fed era tion – the Fed era tive Al li ance of the 
Civil Ser vants Trade Un ions SED-LEX (which be came the Na tional Al li ance of the 
trade un ions State Em ploy ees Sed Lex) is con sti tuted in 2005, re unit ing 64 320 mem-
bers3. The other con fed era tions are the Na tional Trade Un ion of the Civil Ser vants 
re cently formed, the Na tional Fed era tion of Trade Un ions in Lo cal and Pub lic Ad-
mini stra tion, that counted 11 000 mem bers; the Na tional Fo rum of Trade Un ions 
from the Pub lic Ad mini stra tion. The trade un ions in the civil ser vice area are char-
ac ter ized by an ex treme frag men ta tion and a lack of co he sion. Given the speci fic-
ity of this popu la tion, dur ing the post-com mu nist years the po liti cal ac tors have 
adopted dif fer ent strate gies in or der to in trude in the trade un ions’ life. The con-
stant pres ence of poli tics in the un ion af fairs can be il lus trated by the way in which 
the in for mal dia logue and ne go tia tion be tween po liti cal ac tors and the un ions are 
in flu enc ing in a di rect or in di rect man ner the trade un ions’ de ci sions.
One of the most ob vi ous ex am ples of the di rect in flu ence of the poli tics on the 
life of the trade un ions mem bers re gards the phe nome non of the poli ti ci sa tion of 
1 For instance a local trade union leader specified that: ”We had a food shop. It did not work 
and then we developed an association and now […] we have a bar. We hired as employees the 
wives of the trade union’s members […]. We’ve restructured and now we have only the bar 
where we also organize anniversaries and activities for the trade union’s members”.
2 The National Federation of Trade Unions in Local and Public Administration is affiliated 
to Cartel Alfa and is based in the department of Cluj), the National Trade Union of the Civil 
Servants, (the financial sector) is affiliated to CNSLR-Frăţia and to the Federative Union Atlas. 
The National Alliance of the Trade Unions of the State Employees Sed Lex is not affiliated to any 
national confederations.
3 SedLex official website, http://www.sedlex.ro/mtop/dn_prezentare.php (accessed in 
September 2006).
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the civil ser vants. If be fore the adop tion of the le gal pro vi sions, the civil ser vants’ 
ap point ments and dis miss als were highly poli ti cized1, and there were not spe cial-
ized trade un ions in de fend ing the civil ser vants’ rights, the adop tion and im ple-
men ta tion of the Civil Ser vants Stat ute (188/1999) and its suc ces sive modi fi ca tions 
have not con duced to de fini tive changes in this area. How ever, the adop tion of the 
le gal frame work, fa voured the ar ticu la tion of a trade un ion move ment. De spite 
the crea tion of the Na tional Agency of the Civil Ser vants which had as main task 
the moni tor ing the ap pli ca tion of the Civil Ser vants Stat ute and de spite the or gani-
sa tion of spe cial ised civil ser vants un ions, the poli ti ci sa tion of the ad min is tra tive 
body did not dis ap pear. The tra di tional form of poli ti ci sa tion, dic tated by the min-
is ter in of fice still pre vailed at the level of prac tices. This phe nome non is more pre-
sent in the case of those in mana ge rial po si tions, who are the most af fected by the 
poli ti ci sa tion and do not have the right to un ion ize2. How ever, this pro ce dure is 
not suf fi cient in or der to counter un-statu tory dis miss als of civil ser vants3.
In a gen eral frame work of rapid re con figu ra tion of the main ad min is tra tive 
struc tures, the prin ci ple that pre vailed in the dis missal of civil ser vants de pended 
upon the re la tion ship with the po liti cal lead ers in gov ern men tal of fices4 and their 
per sonal con nec tions. The en tan gle ment be tween the po liti cal field and the civil 
ser vants was also en cour aged by a per mis sive and un de fined le gal frame work. In 
fact the civil ser vants that did not oc cupy lead er ship po si tions had also the right to 
be come party mem bers. The main ten dency in these cases (as sig nalled by the Sigma 
re ports but also by the in ter views with po liti cal ac tors5 and with civil ser vants’ 
1 Cornelia LEFTER, Civil Services Report and State Administration (CSSA), Country Report: 
Romania, 31, March 1999, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/8/1850069.pdf (accessed in December 2008.).
2 SIGMA Report on Romania 2003, Support for Improvement in Governance and Mana-
gement in Central and Eastern European Countries – Romania Public Service and the Admi nis-
trative Framework Assessment, http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/41/10/34989438.pdf, p. 4 (accessed 
in December 2008).
3 In this sense, the declaration of one secretary of state in the Năstase’s cabinet is illustrative 
for the arbitrary relations that dominated the dismissal of several civil servants: ”The simplifica-
tion formula had unpleased all the civil servants. Some remained chiefs others not. And then, of 
course, they had to establish who remains and who does not remain. This could not be decided 
only in two days if it was to apply the competence criteria, so the only criterion applied was the 
nepotism…The things were made only in a few days. What was the result? The best were not se-
lected and the worst were promoted in top positions and they are the ones deciding at the present 
in the ministries” (Interview with the secretary of state Ministry of Labour, January 2005).
4 Besides the declaration of the civil servants involved in this process, that contested this 
decision several elements seem to corroborate to their stories: 1. the dismissal of one third of the 
civil servants (Sigma 2002) as a result of the government restructuring was followed in 2002 by 
a proliferation of the public appointments of other civil servants; 2. there is a bi-univocal relation-
ship between the civil servants and the political therefore several civil servants conducted polit-
ical actions in favor of the party can be sustained especially during the electoral campaign (See 
ProDemocraţia Association’s report concerning the electoral campaigns www.apd.ro (accessed 
on 25.02.2008), the declarations made to us by the officials of ANFP sustained the same idea; 3. 
control of the contests organized for the appointment of the civil servants: more than 1/3 of the 
civil servants were dismissed in January 2001, but given the legal provisions they were dismissed 
at the result of a ”test of competence” in order to validate their nomination in function as a result 
of the application for the first time of the Statute (Sigma Report 2002. See http://www.sigmaweb.
org/dataoecd/41/8/34989490.pdf (accessed in June 2008); Cristian GHINEA, Managerul public nr. 1. 
O alegere periculoasă. Politizarea în administraţia publică centrală, www.sar.org.ro/ﬁ les_h/docs/advoca-
cy_foia/10_pm1.pdf (accessed in February 2009).
5 Interviews with Marta Ţărnea, secretary of state in the Ministry of Labour, Zoe Petre pres-
ident’s Emil Constantinescu advisor (conducted on 20th of March 2005).
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repre sen ta tives) un der pinned the idea of a phe nome non of po liti cal mi gra tion of 
the civil ser vants in the mo ment of an al ter na tion in power. Even if there are no clear 
sta tis tics of the di men sions of poli ti ci sa tion, a fluc tua tion in the gen eral num ber of 
civil ser vants can be ob served1. The scar city of data re gard ing the civil ser vants 
body sug gest the fact that in elec toral years there is a ten dency to re duce the di men-
sion of the civil ser vant’s body in or der to ap point then other per sons who are loyal 
to the new com ers2.  Va sile Marica, the leader of the Un ion of the Civil Ser vants’ 
Trade-Un ions rec og nizes the ex is tence of such prac tices and ar gues that the dis-
course re gard ing the block age cre ated by the civil ser vants is used by the poli ti cians 
“to dis miss the civil ser vants and to ap point their rela tives, their neph ews, etc”3.
In this gen eral con text of high poli ti ci sa tion of the civil ser vants body, it would 
seem that the trade un ions play only a mar ginal role in the de fence of this popu la-
tion’s rights. The trade un ions’ of fi cial po si tion was more cen tred on an ideo logi cal 
fight against poli ti ci sa tion, leav ing aside the re veal ing of spe cific cases of po liti cal 
in tru sion. In the case of those dis missed on a po liti cal cri te rion, the un ion pro vided 
le gal as sis tance, but did not pub li cise the ex ist ing situa tion. As the main re quest of 
the mem bers is re lated to the fi nan cial is sue, the un ion of fi cials be lieved that the 
main role of a un ion is to ful fil the mem bers’ de mands. This lack of ac tion in spe-
cific cases was dou bled by an other prob lem: the lack of co he sion at the level of the 
civil ser vants move ment. In the case of the dis miss als of civil ser vants by the po liti-
cal power in 2001 (by us ing dif fer ent strate gies such as the ex ploi ta tion of the flaws 
in the leg is la tive frame work, the pro ce dure of suc ces sive modi fi ca tions and re vi-
sions of the le gal pro vi sions and of the gov ern men tal struc tures), only one trade un-
ion, the most in sig nifi cant one in what con cerns the lev els of mem ber ship, stood up 
in or der to pub licly de nounce the po liti cal dis miss als4.This poli tics of cau tion of the 
civil ser vants’ trade un ions lead ers has been re warded by the po liti cal scene. In ex-
change of their lim ited ac tions, the trade un ions of the civil ser vants gain auton-
omy, their rec og ni tion as part ners in the so cial dia logue and a black mail po ten tial.
As al ready men tioned, the civil ser vants move ment is deeply frag mented. Al-
though the emer gence of these or gani sa tions is linked to the adop tion of the law in 
1 For instance, in 1995, there were 130 607 civil servants, in 1996, which is an electoral year 
125 145, and after the alternation in power, there were 130 344. Variations in the number of the 
civil servants can also be observed during Adrian Năstase’s mandate. In December 2000, we 
assist at a decrease of 30% of the total number of the civil servants. In March 2001, there were 
115 000 civil servants, in 2002, the whole administrative body had 135 000 civil servants and in 
June 2003 there number of the civil servants was significantly reduced at 110 505 civil servants. 
See the annual reports of the National Agency of the Civil Servants, http://www.anfp-map.ro/ (ac-
cessed in December 2008).
2 Independent reports monitoring the profesionnalisation of civil servants underline this 
procedure in the Romanian case, as showed by the Sigma’s report in 2002: ”Political and personal 
connections are the only factor that really count when it comes to promotion and career develop-
ment” (http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/41/8/34989490.pdf) and the same report in 2005 
shows that ”some law provisions concerning dismissal and recruitment were not strictly applied 
after the current government took office” (Sigma 2005, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/40/35850904.
pdf, p. 6 [accessed in December 2008]).
3 Interview with the leader of the Union of the Trade-Unions of the Civil Servants, Vasile 
Marica, conducted on 12th of February 2006.
4 Interview with Bogdan Drăghici the former leader of the National Trade Union of the Civil 
Servants, one of the first trade unions that were created after the adoption of the Civil Servant 
Statute that later on disappeared. Interview conducted on 20th of January 2006.
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1999, there is a per ma nent re con figu ra tion of the move ment. Tak ing into ac count 
this phe nome non, the new con se crated struc tures are mainly fo cused on the presi-
dent. For ex am ple, in the case of Sed Lex Na tional Al li ance in 2007, the presi dent’s 
statu tory pre roga tives al lowed him to con trol the other de ci sional bod ies in the 
fed era tion. Be sides the usual pre roga tives, the presi dent pro poses to the Coun cil 
of the Un ion the ap point ment or the dis missal of the sec re tary gen eral, he can also 
pro pose the nomi na tion and dis missal of the vice-presi dents and of the di rec tor-
ate com mit tee. Fur ther more, the main de ci sion-mak ing bod ies in the fed era tion, 
such as the Ex ecu tive Bu reau and the Di rec tor ate Com mit tee are com posed 
mainly by the same per sons. If the Ex ecu tive Bu reau is formed by the presi dent, 
vice-presi dents and the sec re tary gen eral, the di rec tor com mit tee also in cludes 
these per sons and the presi dents of the af fili ated fed era tions. As for the na tional 
con gress, the su preme body of in ter nal de ci sion-mak ing, it re unites every five 
years, but tak ing into ac count the fact that the fed era tion is new, Con gress has not 
had the op por tu nity to fully ac com plish its func tions. A simi lar in ter nal struc ture 
can be de picted in the case of the Na tional Trade Un ion of the Civil Ser vants. The 
Presi dent of the un ion can ap point and dis miss the Di rec tor ate Com mit tee (art. 23) 
and also ap points the di rec tors at the county level (art. 30). As a re sult, the emer-
gent civil ser vants’ trade un ions are con structed on very hi er ar chi cal prin ci ples, 
show ing that the presi dent is en sur ing the con trol over the in ter nal or gani sa tion. 
This pa ro chial type of or gani sa tion, very cen tral ised is pre served as in the case of 
the con fed era tion level by the pro mo tion of dif fer ent sets of in cen tives. The Sed 
Lex Na tional Al li ance opted for the crea tion of sys tems of le gal as sis tance for their 
mem bers and edu ca tive pro grams, the Na tional Un ion of the Civil Ser vants mo bi-
lise dif fer ent founds in or der to as sist their mem bers and to of fer them a set of cul-
tural and edu ca tive pro grams (art. 5). This ac tiv ity was dou bled by a set of fa cili ties 
given to the trade un ions’ mem bers.
Con clu sions
As in the other post-com mu nist coun tries, the Ro ma nian trade un ions fol lowed 
a dif fi cult proc ess of con soli da tion. How ever the pat terns of be hav iour de vel oped 
by the trade un ions in Ro ma nia are simi lar to the ones en coun tered in weak cor po ra-
tist tra di tions of the West ern Euro pean coun tries. The newly emer gent un ions are 
char ac ter ised by their close ness to the state and by a top down ar ticu la tion of the de-
ci sion mak ing at the in tra un ion level. This gen eral trend de scrib ing the na tional 
level can also be iden ti fied in the case of the lower lev els of the or gani sa tions such 
as the fed era tive ones. The ele ments that por tray the trade un ions in Ro ma nia con-
sti tute bar ri ers in the con soli da tion of an autono mous so cial field, but, in the same 
time, they en cour age the emer gence of a stra te gic type of trade un ion ism, based 
on a sys tem of dis tri bu tion of col lec tive in cen tives to wards the un ions’ mem bers.
In the Ro ma nian case, there is a blurred line be tween poli tics and the un ion 
move ment in sti tut ing a bi-uni vo cal in ter ac tion be tween the po liti cal lead ers or the 
po liti cal par ties and the lead ers of the un ions. The trade un ions’ chiefs mi grate to 
poli tics, they are co-opted from the so cial in ter est rep re sen ta tion sphere in the po-
liti cal port fo lios, they adopt dis tinct ideo logi cal dis courses, they re spond in their 
ac tions to the po liti cal de mands. Nev er the less, dur ing the post-com mu nist years, 
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there is a shift in the trade un ions’ be hav iour to wards an in crease of their auton-
omy. This evo lu tion can not be con du cive to the uni fi ca tion of the trade un ions in 
a sin gle con fed era tion given a dif fer ent ar ticu la tion of in ter ests, but it al lows the 
crea tion of a pow er ful bar gain ing po ten tial for the un ions.
The re con figu ra tion of the trade un ions’ strate gies is fa voured by the ar ticu la-
tion at the in tra un ion level of cen tral ised model of de ci sion-mak ing. The top 
down con struc tion of power at the in tra un ion level cre ates the prem ises for an ex-
ten sive lib erty of ac tion of the un ions’ lead ers. Fur ther more, the auton omy of the 
trade un ions as the main fea ture of the sta bi li sa tion proc ess is founded on a par al lel 
de vel op ment of the trade un ion’s eco nomic ac tions that al lows them to en sure their 
fi nan cial sur vival with out de pend ing only on the mem ber ship fees which are low 
and fa vours the con struc tion of net works of loy alty at all lev els. In this man ner, the 
trade un ions’ sphere is touched by a ”mar keti sa tion” of their ac tions, which, para-
doxi cally, en sures their con soli da tion as part ners in the ne go tia tion proc ess.
